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Abstract
The current study avoided the typical laboratory context to determine instead whether over-
imitation—the disposition to copy even visibly, causally unnecessary actions—occurs in a
real-world context in which participants are unaware of being in an experiment. We dis-
guised a puzzle-box task as an interactive item available to the public within a science
engagement zone of Edinburgh Zoo. As a member of the public approached, a confederate
acting as a zoo visitor retrieved a reward from the box using a sequence of actions contain-
ing both causally relevant and irrelevant elements. Despite the absence of intentional dem-
onstration, or social pressure to copy, a majority of both child and even adult observers
included all causally irrelevant actions in their reproduction. This occurred even though
causal irrelevance appeared manifest because of the transparency of the puzzle-box. That
over-imitation occurred so readily in a naturalistic context, devoid of social interaction and
pressure, suggests that humans are opportunistic social learners throughout the lifespan,
copying the actions of other individuals even when these actions are not intentionally dem-
onstrated, and their causal significance is not readily apparent. The disposition to copy com-
prehensively, even when a mere onlooker, likely provides humans, irrespective of their age,
with a powerful mechanism to extract maximal information from the social environment.
Introduction
As a species humans are highly effective social learners, frequently capitalizing on the knowl-
edge and experience of others to acquire useful new behaviors [1, 2]. As a strategy, social rather
than individual learning is likely to be extremely useful in many circumstances, circumventing
the problem of naïve individuals having to acquire new skills through trial and error, a process
which could potentially be costly in terms of time and effort. Such benefits of social learning
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are readily apparent, but there is also a less obvious pitfall to this process in that the indiscrimi-
nate (over)application of social learning may lead observers to acquire suboptimal behavioral
variants [3]. This may be particularly true in the domain of tools and artefacts where the func-
tion of novel objects is frequently opaque [4], so that although this can be a context in which
learning from others is extremely valuable, it leaves observers at the mercy of the competence
of the demonstrating individual.
Although it may appear at first glance surprising that human social learning could be so vul-
nerable to the acquisition of ‘unwanted’ behaviors, a suite of experiments have suggested that
not only is the acquisition of suboptimal behavior possible [5–12], it can be extremely resistant
to attempts to inhibit it [13–15]. An experimental analogue of such acquisition of suboptimal
behaviors has been dubbed ‘over-imitation’ [7] to describe instances where observers copy the
superfluous actions performed by a model with such a high level of fidelity that task efficiency
is reduced. The typical scenario in over-imitation studies is that an observer watches an adult
model demonstrate a series of causally relevant and irrelevant actions on a puzzle-box before
the sequence culminates in the retrieval of a reward from inside the box. The most frequent
outcome, irrespective of whether the observer is a child or an adult, and even when the irrele-
vance appears visibly manifest (because the apparatus is made transparent), is one in which the
observer reproduces the majority of the actions contained in the demonstration, goal relevant
or otherwise, with a high level of fidelity [16]. The tendency of children to over-imitate in such
tasks is evident from the age of 3 to 4 years, with subsequent increases in over-imitation occur-
ring later in development, adults reproducing more irrelevant actions than children [16, 17],
and older children (six years plus) performing more irrelevant actions than their preschool
counterparts [14]. The precision of such copying, by children and adults alike, has been found
to extend even to stylistic details in the way in which the individual irrelevant actions were per-
formed [10, 16].
The pervasiveness of over-imitation has been seen as something of a puzzle, and coupled
with the finding that the same behavioral tendency occurs in a variety of cultures [14, 18], and
has not been found in other primate species [19, 20], has sparked a great deal of experimental
and theoretical interest. This has resulted in the generation of many wide-ranging explanatory
hypotheses for the phenomenon which encompass social [21], normative [8, 15, 22, 23], peda-
gogical [24], and informational/causal [7, 25] dimensions of social learning. Under social and
normative accounts of over-imitation observers may recognize that the irrelevant actions are
not causally necessary, but perform them so as to affiliate with the model by appearing like
them [21], or to conform to the social norm of how the object ‘ought’ to be operated [8, 15, 22,
23]. By contrast, informational/causal accounts of over-imitation propose that the observer
believes the irrelevant actions to be causally necessary, and so reproduces them, even if their
function is somewhat unclear [7, 25]. Despite the differences between these hypotheses, they
share an underlying assumption that the apparent pervasiveness of over-imitation means that
it is very likely to serve some adaptive function; only the hypothesized underlying motivation
or function of the disposition varies.
However, the relevant empirical studies have all been conducted in an experimental ‘labora-
tory’ context. Although such experimental manipulations of social learning provide invaluable
insights into the processes involved, the test contexts have been somewhat unnatural, and may
place artificial demands on the observer that would not be present in a real-world context. This
may be particularly true of over-imitation, where the participant is asked to view a model per-
form actions that appear unnecessary for completing the task; a context which has the potential
to appear somewhat contrived or at the very least slightly unusual. This atypical context could
lead observers, particularly in the case of adults, to interpret the model’s intentional demon-
stration as an approach to the task that ‘ought to be copied’, rather than revealing anything
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meaningful about the way in which social learning operates in everyday life. This begs the ques-
tion of whether observers who were free from such experimental demands would over-imitate,
or opt instead to operate more independently and efficiently.
The central aim of the current study was thus to test the real-world occurrence and rele-
vance of over-imitation, in both children and adults, across an age range over which over-imi-
tation has been demonstrated in prior experiments conducted within a laboratory context.
This was done by employing a novel methodology in which the task demonstration was
detached from the confines of the typical lab set-up, and instead presented in an everyday con-
text in which the participants were unaware that they were taking part in an experiment. In
order to do this we capitalized on a resource available to us in the ‘Living Links to Human Evo-
lution Research Centre’, a University of St Andrews primate research center in Edinburgh Zoo.
The Living Links Centre showcases live behavioral studies on two primate species and actively
supports public engagement with science, with a number of puzzles, games and other interac-
tive items available for visitors to engage with in a ‘Science Exploration Zone’ [26]. We posi-
tioned our puzzle-box between these interactive items so that it appeared to be one of the many
‘games’ available to the public rather than an experimental task. From this location the experi-
menter could easily complete the task in view of an approaching member of the public whilst
appearing to be a zoo visitor themselves. This allowed us to eliminate experimental influences
whilst providing a realistic vehicle to present a scenario of task completion, including causally
unnecessary elements, to the observers.
The novelty of our methodological approach lends itself to a variety of different predictions,
each of which varies according to the motivations and/or functions believed to underpin the
over-imitative disposition in differently aged observers. One possibility is that the high levels of
over-imitation witnessed in both children and adults in conventional lab based studies stem
from similar underlying processes, whether these be a susceptibility to social pressure/influence
(although the precise social influence may vary with observer age), or the over-employment of
a copying process in which the irrelevant actions are viewed as causally necessary. Such com-
monalities between children and adults would lead us to predict comparable patterns of perfor-
mance across the two age groups in our naturalistic context; either a blanket reduction in over-
imitation due to the alleviation of social pressure, or continued high levels of over-imitation if
caused by participants’ assumption that useful information is being gained. Alternatively, chil-
dren and adults may over-imitate in lab based studies for different reasons, thus potentially
generating different patterns of performance when the confines of the traditional experiment
are removed in our experiment. It may be that adults, perhaps more cognizant of the redundant
nature of the causally irrelevant actions, over-imitate in conventional over-imitation studies
due to a sensitivity to the demand characteristics inherent to a lab context (‘it’s what I’m
expected to do’), whereas children, who are still relatively inexperienced with both artefacts
and cultural conventions, may be copying to learn about how the mysterious novel object
works. Such differing functions and their associated motivations would lead to a reduction in
over-imitation outside of the laboratory context for adult observers, and potentially older chil-
dren, but predict continued over-imitation in younger observers more influenced by the con-
tent of the naturalistic demonstration.
Materials and Methods
Ethics Statement
The study was approved by the Psychology Ethics Committee at St Andrews University (Appli-
cation #Ps6123). Written informed consent was obtained from the adult participants as well as
from the parents of the children who took part.
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Participants
Participants were 93 adults (M = 29.6 years, range: 16 to 62 years, SD = 11.2 years), 64 younger
children (M = 7.5 years, range: 4 to 9 years, SD = 1.4 years), and 64 older children (M = 11.6
years, range: 10–15 years, SD = 1.5 years) with an approximately equal number of males and
females in each age group. This wide age spread for the children was in part a product of the
spontaneous participation inherent in our naturalistic approach. The participants were divided
into two groups; a ‘demonstration’ group comprising 100 participants (35 adults and 65 chil-
dren) and a ‘no-demonstration’ control group comprising 121 participants (58 adults and 63
children). A greater number of adult participants were allocated to the control group than the
demonstration group as on occasion zoo visitors, who were earmarked for the demonstration
condition, began to interact with the puzzle box before the model was able to commence their
actions on the box. Rather than excluding these participants from the study they were allowed
to continue to interact with the box and were subsequently included in the control group. Two
additional participants were excluded from the study, one who did not wish their data to be
recorded, and one who was unable to complete the experiment as English was not their first
language.
Apparatus
The apparatus used was the same transparent, polycarbonate puzzle box which had been suc-
cessfully employed with children and adults in previous studies [10,; see Fig 1]. The task dem-
onstration involved the model performing a sequence of causally irrelevant actions towards a
bolt ‘defense’ situated on the top of the box before ultimately withdrawing a reward (a magnet-
backed laminated note which read ‘Congratulations! Please speak to a researcher and leave this
box as you found it’) from inside the box using a magnet tipped probe. The causally irrelevant
elements of the demonstration were always performed first and comprised two stages: 1) the
probe was used to slide out the bolt defense in order to uncover a hole on top of the box, and 2)
the probe was inserted into the hole and struck multiple times against a false ceiling inside the
box. On completion of the irrelevant actions the model performed a two stage causally relevant
sequence: 1) a second door defense on the front of the box was manually moved in order to
uncover a hole on the face of the box, and 2) the probe was inserted into the hole behind to
retrieve the reward from an opaque tunnel. Of interest was whether participants would copy all
of the actions irrespective of their causal relevance (i.e., over-imitate), or perform only the
actions necessary to obtain the goal.
Two-action approach. As well as exploring whether the participants would copy the caus-
ally irrelevant actions we were interested in whether stylistic details of the actions would be
adopted in this highly naturalistic context. In order to explore this possibility the model
removed the bolt defense using one of two different techniques: push the bolts from their back,
or drag them from their fronts. If social learning was evident at the stylistic level, the partici-
pants would be more likely to perform the observed technique rather than the alternative.
Procedure
‘Demonstration’ Condition. The overall aim of the ‘demonstration’ condition was to cre-
ate a context where the task demonstration was viewed by the participants in as naturalistic a
manner as possible. In order to achieve this two female experimenters (experimenter 1 who
acted as the ‘model’ and experimenter 2 who acted as the ‘onlooker’), both wearing everyday
clothes and pretending to be visitors to the zoo, interacted with the items in the vicinity of the
puzzle-box as a real zoo visitor, naïve to the puzzle box, approached the ‘games’ area. A visitor
was deemed to be naïve to the task if they were known not to have interacted with, or seen any
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Fig 1. The ‘model’ demonstrates a series of actions, some of which are irrelevant to goal retrieval
(removing bolt defence, inserting tool into top hole), and some which are relevant to goal retrieval
(removing door defence, inserting tool into lower hole). These actions are illustrated above: (a) dragging
bolt; (b) causally irrelevant tool insertion into top hole; (c) causally relevant tool insertion into front hole.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0159920.g001
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other individual interact, with the puzzle-box previously. This could reliably be known because
of experimenters’ continual surveillance of the small Exploration Zone. Once the visitor began
to interact with the activity directly adjacent to the puzzle box (positioned<1 meter away to
ensure that the demonstration was in clear view of the visitor) experimenter 1 positioned her-
self in front of the puzzle-box and performed a task demonstration (see Fig 2). To maintain the
non-experimental guise of the task, and to motivate the visitor to retrieve the reward, the
model laughed when she read the note that she extracted from the box. On completion of the
task demonstration the model returned the box to its original state, before moving onto
another interactive item out of the visitor’s view as the latter focused on the puzzle box, whilst
subtly observing the visitor’s actions on the box. The reinstatement of the puzzle box was the
reason that laughter was introduced as a substitute for a reward object to be taken away,
because the latter obviously could not have been re-inserted, whereas it was plausible the lami-
nated message was simply popped back in, and the box politely left as it had been found. In
order to ensure that the actions performed by the visitor were reliably coded, and that the
experimental subject could be confirmed to attend to the task demonstration, a second experi-
menter equally inconspicuously observed, and mentally noted, the behavior of the participant
from behind an interactive video display.
The visitor was allowed to manipulate the puzzle-box for as long as they wished. However,
if at any point the visitor successfully extracted the reward from the box, both experimenters
approached the visitor and explained that ‘he/she [the visitor] had taken part in an experiment’,
before asking the visitor whether he/she would be willing to have their data (or their child’s
data) recorded. Those participants who indicated that they were willing to have their data
Fig 2. Illustration of the experimental set-up in the Science Exploration Zone of Living Links. Experimenter 2 acting
in the role of a zoo visitor (A) observes Experimenter 1 (B) manipulating the experimental puzzle box (D). The puzzle
box is situated amongst other interactive activities (C) available for the public to explore.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0159920.g002
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included in the study (only one person refused) were asked three questions to ensure that they
were unaware that they were taking part in an experiment; (1) ‘Did you realize that you were
taking part in an experiment?’ (2) ‘Did you realize you were being watched?’ (3) ‘Who did you
think this girl [the model] was when you watched her play with the box?’ (answers consistently
confirmed negative responses on the first two questions, and that the model had been believed
to be just another zoo visitor). On completion of the experiment both experimenters indepen-
dently recorded all of the actions performed by the visitor and then agreed on the coding.
No-demonstration Control Condition.. Participants in the control condition were zoo
visitors who interacted with the box without having viewed either the model, or another zoo
visitor, interact with the box previously. The procedure for approaching the visitors and
recording their behavior was identical to that used in the demonstration condition with the
exception that question 3 was omitted. In both the control and demonstration conditions the
experimenters approached, and recorded data from, only those zoo visitors who successfully
extracted the reward from the puzzle box. Adopting reward retrieval as our primary inclusion
criterion allowed us to meaningfully compare the number of causally irrelevant actions per-
formed in the control and demonstration conditions, a key comparison in determining
whether the model’s demonstration influenced the observer’s subsequent approach to the task.
Coding
Irrelevant action score. An ‘irrelevant action’ score was calculated for each participant that
ranged from 0 to 2. Participants who reproduced all of the irrelevant actions performed by the
model (i.e., removed the bolts and inserted the tool into the top hole) received a score of 2, a par-
tial imitation (i.e., removed the bolts but failed to insert the tool into the top hole) scored 1
point, with those participants who performed no element of the irrelevant sequence scoring 0.
Stylistic fidelity score. As well as recording whether or not the participants removed the
bolts we also noted the technique they used for doing so. If the participant removed the bolt
defense using the same technique as their model they received a score of 1, with those partici-
pants who showed no fidelity to the observed technique scoring 0. Instances were a participant
performed both the drag and push technique scored 0.5.
Inter-rater agreement. The actions performed by each participant were coded indepen-
dently by the two experimenters. Inter-rater agreement was perfect both for the occurrence of
irrelevant actions (Cohen’s κ = 1.0), and the technique used to remove the bolt defense
(Cohen’s κ = 1.0); these were highly visible and distinctive alternatives.
Results
All of the 221 participants who took part in the study indicated that they did not believe them-
selves to be: a) under the observation of the experimenter(s), or b) taking part in an experiment
(two young children required this question to be clarified). In addition all of the participants
thought the ‘model’ was a visitor to the zoo. The data from all participants was therefore
included in the subsequent analyses (see S1 File).
Reproduction of causally irrelevant actions
Of initial interest in the analysis was whether the participants would copy the irrelevant actions
performed by the ‘model’ when observing these actions in a naturalistic context, and whether
any over-imitation witnessed would vary according to the age of the observer. Across the entire
sample the majority of the participants who viewed a task demonstration (84 of 100 partici-
pants) performed all, or part, of the irrelevant action sequence. In contrast very few irrelevant
actions were evident in the ‘No-demonstration control’ condition with only 18 of the 121
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control participants performing a complete, or partial, irrelevant sequence (median irrelevant
score demonstration condition = 2; median irrelevant score control condition = 0; U(1) = 1694,
Z = -10.28, N1 = 100, N2 = 121, p< .001; see Fig 3). In order to determine whether observer age
influenced the level of over-imitation witnessed, the sample was divided into two groups of
child participants (younger children: 4–9 years, and older children: 10–15 years), and an adult
group (all participants aged over 16 years). Kruskal- Wallis tests conducted on the number of
irrelevant actions performed (bolts plus insertions, bolts only, or no irrelevant actions) by each
age group (younger children, older children, or adults) revealed that there were no significant
age differences in the occurrence of over-imitation in either the demonstration condition
(median irrelevant score demonstration condition = 2 at each age), or the control condition
(median irrelevant score control condition = 0 at each age). The high levels of over-imitation
witnessed within each age group was further evidenced by the significantly greater number of
irrelevant actions performed in the demonstration condition, than the control condition, at
each age; 4- to 9-year-olds, U(1) = 96.5, Z = -6.17, N1 = 34, N2 = 30, p< .001; 10- to 15-year-
olds, U(1) = 85.5, Z = -6.22, N1 = 31, N2 = 33, p< .001; adults, U(1) = 428, Z = -5.49, N1 = 35,
N2 = 58, p< .001: see Fig 3.
Reproduction of stylistic detail: Bolt defense removal
As well as determining whether or not the causally irrelevant actions would be copied in a non-
experimental context we were also interested in whether precise details of the technique
employed by the model to remove the bolt defense would be faithfully reproduced, and whether
any stylistic fidelity witnessed would vary according to the age of the observer. The results show
that the fidelity to the technique witnessed was high across the sample, with the majority of the
participants who removed the bolt defense in the ‘Demonstration condition’ (N = 84) doing so
Fig 3. Percentage number of participants in each age group who performed all (bolts plus insertions), part (bolts
only), or none of the irrelevant action sequence.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0159920.g003
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using the same technique as that performed by their model as opposed to the alternative tech-
nique (78 same technique, 6 alternative technique, U(1) = 126, Z = -7.81, N1 = 44, N2 = 40,
p< .001; see Fig 4). The tendency to engage in high fidelity stylistic copying was high irrespec-
tive of observer age, with a Kruskal-Wallis test revealing that the tendency to adopt the demon-
strated technique did not vary across the three age groups. The high level of stylistic fidelity
witnessed within each age group was further evidenced by participants of all ages performing
the technique witnessed (median observed technique = 1 at each age) significantly more often
than the alternative technique (median alternative technique = 0 at each age), 4–9 years, U-
(1) = 14.5, Z = -4.55, N1 = 16, N2 = 13, p< .001; 10–15 years, U(1) = 16.0, Z = -4.70, N1 = 16,
N2 = 14, p< .001; adults, U(1) = 13.0, Z = -4.16, N1 = 12, N2 = 13, p< .00; see Fig 4.
Discussion
The central aim of the current study was to eschew the experimental context traditionally used
to study over-imitation, in order to determine whether visibly causally irrelevant actions would
be copied in a naturalistic context in which the participants were unaware that they were taking
part in an experiment, and therefore free from any social pressures inherent to prior lab based
studies. In order to achieve such a real-world context our child and adult participants viewed
an individual, whom they believed to be another zoo visitor, retrieve a reward from inside a
transparent puzzle box, using an action sequence which contained elements that were readily
discernible as causally irrelevant. Despite the fact that the model was unknown to the observer,
performed the task only once, did not directly ‘teach’ the task to the observer, and physically
moved away from the area in which the puzzle box was located before the participant
attempted the task, the majority of participants, irrespective of their age, performed the causally
irrelevant actions when they themselves attempted the task. That the participants so readily
Fig 4. Percentage number of participants in each age group who dragged or pushed the bolts as a function of
technique witnessed.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0159920.g004
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over-imitated in such a ‘stripped back’ learning context demonstrates that merely on-looking
can lead an observer to adopt the techniques used by other individuals, even when such tech-
niques appear manifestly inefficient and causally inexplicable. This capacity suggests that
humans are opportunistic social learners from a very young age, capitalizing on even fleeting
chances to learn fine grained details of action techniques intentionally performed by other indi-
viduals on novel artefacts. Perhaps most surprisingly, even the adult participants were subject
to this effect despite the causal irrelevance of the actions witnessed being so visible.
The principal question raised by our results is why such a minimal learning context should
lead both adults and children alike to abandon their own causal knowledge relevant to the task
(displayed in the control condition) and instead adopt the inefficient technique used by the
person they had just observed. One important influence which may result in the reproduction
of causally irrelevant actions in experimental studies of over-imitation is the social influence of
the model. In typical over-imitation studies the model (who is often the experimenter) demon-
strates the task directly in front of the observer one or more times, before passing over the task
with the instruction “Now it’s your turn”. Of course participants are not invited to imitate, but
such experimental contexts likely contain a number of social influences which may impact on
the likelihood that the observers will over-imitate. First, these influences may elicit a motiva-
tion on the part of the observer to affiliate with the model by acting like them; second, they
may place social pressure on the observer to conform to performing the task in the same way
as the model; or third, they may provide an opportunity for the observer to engage in a shared
experience with the model [13, 21, 27, 28](for a review see [29]). In our naturalistic context all
such potential social demands were essentially absent, suggesting that such social influences
were unlikely to be the motivation behind the over-imitation witnessed. The lack of a direct
face-to-face demonstration by the model also rules out a fourth social influence, that the occur-
rence of over-imitation was dependent on pedagogical cues [30, 31], as no such cues were pres-
ent in the display witnessed. The high fidelity copying nevertheless witnessed across our
sample suggests that other age independent motivations may be responsible for eliciting over-
imitation in such a context. To be clear, we are not suggesting that such direct social influences
never play a role in motivating over-imitation; to the contrary, a range of studies show they can
[6, 23, 27]. But within a naturalistic context, merely viewing another individual’s task solution
can elicit a ‘copy-all’ strategy.
If the social theories outlined above cannot readily explain the high fidelity copying within
our naturalistic context then perhaps informational/causal theories may provide greater insight
into the behavior of the participants. Causal theories of over-imitation share in common that
the causally irrelevant actions are included in the participant’s reproduction as these actions
are assumed to be necessary to achieve the goal (even if their exact purpose remains unspeci-
fied). In one such theory, “copy-all, refine later”, it is proposed that children who over-imitate
are displaying an adaptive disposition to initially copy all of the model’s actions, then later
refine their approach as necessary on the basis of experience, thus weeding out any occasional
mistaken causal links [25, 32]. A twist on this theory, dubbed the “Automatic Coding Hypothe-
sis”, proposes that children automatically encode all actions intentionally performed by a
model as causally necessary [7, 13]. The automatic coding hypothesis predicts extreme fidelity
in the copying of irrelevant actions, leaving little room for the flexible deployment of copying
behavior. The high levels of over-imitation witnessed in the present study are consistent with
such an apparently ‘indiscriminate copying’ account of over-imitation, and perhaps surpris-
ingly, suggest that a relatively blanket copying process is not restricted to early childhood,
where one may anticipate such a strategy to be most useful, and instead continues into adult-
hood. However, the performance of the minority of participants in each age group who omitted
all of the causally irrelevant actions indicates that high fidelity copying is not as consistent as
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the theory of automatic coding would predict (c.f. [14], [33–36]. This suggests that although
the levels of over-imitation we observed are broadly consistent with an automatic coding
account, it is likely that such a mechanism, if it were employed, involves a greater degree of
flexibility than that proposed by Lyons and colleagues.
However, a final explanation to be considered is that although direct social interaction is
not necessary for the strong over-imitation effects we observed, participants may nevertheless
have perceived the actor’s performance as prescriptively normative; that is, an approach that
one ought to take, because it is a cultural norm. This may also be regarded as a socially-based
explanation competing with informational/causal explanations, although a more indirect one if
it can occur without direct social interaction. Evidence that children may over-imitate because
of prescriptive normativity comes from recent studies using a ‘protest paradigm’. These have
shown that preschool children who initially viewed an adult model perform an action sequence
containing causally irrelevant actions frequently protested when a puppet subsequently omit-
ted the causally irrelevant actions from their reproduction [8, 15, 22, 23]. Finding that this may
occur even when the puppet successfully completes the task and obtains the reward, Kenward
[8] argues this rejects the automatic causal encoding hypothesis in favor of an effect whereby
children instead tend to view all adult actions as prescriptively normative. Could this explain
our results? Reasons to think not refer to two main potential bases for the activation of pre-
scriptive normativity. One derives from descriptive normativity, where one observes that a
form of action is common in a community; a substantial corpus of intriguing studies in the
broader influence literature show that perceiving what is descriptively normative in a group
leads experimental participants to assume and act under the influence of prescriptive norma-
tivity [37]. This is surely not relevant in our experiment since participants saw only a single
model act on the puzzle-box a single time. The second basis is where the model offers cues that
actions are prescriptively normative, which does not require a group effect and can in principle
be elicited by a single model. For example, when preschool children in one experiment were
presented with a sequence of actions which were verbally framed as conventional (‘rituals’),
imitative fidelity increased over that witnessed with instrumental framing (and this occurred
particularly when the verbal frame was accompanied by the other indicator of social conven-
tionality noted above, multiple synchronous models [38]. Such effects also occurred in the pro-
test-paradigm over-imitation studies cited above, with a solo model. However, these appeared
replete with cues to prescriptive normativity, which may be broadly thought of as pedagogical.
Thus in Kenward’s study [8], in a warm up session children were already encouraged to watch
what an adult did and then do it, and help correct the mistakes of a puppet doing the same;
then in the experiment proper, “the demonstrator first instructed the child and puppet to
watch” (p. 200), a cue that what followed is what the child should note is what one ought to do.
Such cues were explicitly avoided in our experimental configuration, so that neither of the
two bases for eliciting prescriptively normative responses outlined above were in play, implying
that the over-imitation we observed occurred because of participants encoding of the assumed
informational and causal content of the irrelevant actions. However, we note that like many
concepts and terms in our field, ‘normativity’ has been interpreted by some authors to cover a
very broad spectrum, including not only being influenced by the most obvious socially-related
case of rituals and other cultural conventions, but also by informational and causal instances,
insofar as one ‘should’ do whatever best achieves one’s instrumental goals, and the norms of
one’s community are a good guide to this. As Kenward [8] puts it, “In this case, the relevant
normative domain is that of instrumental rationality, according to which, all else being equal,
an agent should perform an action that leads to the agent’s goal” (p. 197). However, this is a
very different sense of ‘normative’ to that related to cultural conventions, and in the case of our
experiment, given that the participant has no additional evidence that what the model does is
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normative in the sense of being common in the community, arguably amounts to no more
than a rule akin to ‘copy what another person does because it is likely a good guide to what will
work in this case’, as suggested in our original ‘copy-all, refine later’ hypothesis [32].
Whatever the outcome of such ongoing debates about the underlying explanations for over-
imitation, the novelty of the current findings lies in demonstrating that over-imitation may
occur in both children and adults even in contexts of minimal social ‘demand’, for in our study
the usual ‘lab’ experimental context was replaced by one where the participant did not know at
the time they were in an experiment, and they were left by themselves to perform whatever
actions they wished. These results show that although evidence shows that in some contexts
direct social interaction, including pedagogy, can enhance over-imitation, they are not essential
causal factors (c.f. [23]). A capacity to rapidly acquire new behaviors outside of a social or ped-
agogical context likely serves an important function. Although pedagogy can be important in
the transmission of cultural behavior from one individual to another, particularly from adult to
child, without a capacity to capitalize on the information that we merely ‘eavesdrop’ on, many
opportunities for the rapid acquisition of novel skills and social conventions would be missed.
Importantly, the current results suggest that this capacity for fast acquisition is not restricted to
early childhood, with humans continuing to engage in a ‘copy-all, refine later’ strategy up to,
and throughout, adulthood. Thus rather than being an artefact of a contrived experimental
context, the occurrence of over-imitation in the real world, as demonstrated in our study, likely
maximizes the power of the human capacity to obtain all the practical and conventional skills
that are foundational to human culture.
Supporting Information
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